Law professor Johnny Rex Buckles critiques a foundational pro-abortion philosophical essay, arguing most abortions are unjust even under its assumptions.
In a newly published legal-philosophical article titled \”A Defense of the Unborn Person,\” University of Houston law professor Johnny Rex Buckles challenges widely cited arguments for abortion rights by reinterpreting the core logic of philosopher Judith Jarvis Thomson’s seminal 1971 essay, A Defense of Abortion. The paper, which appears in Volume 28 of the Texas Review of Law & Politics, contends that abortion is unjust in most circumstances—even when assuming, as Thomson does for argument’s sake, that fetuses are persons.
Buckles’ article enters a shifting legal landscape following the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2022 decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, which overturned Roe v. Wade and held that there is no constitutional right to abortion. This reversal has placed abortion law back in the hands of state legislatures, many of which have enacted restrictive abortion laws in the wake of Dobbs.
Thomson’s original essay famously introduced the “violinist” analogy, wherein a person wakes up involuntarily connected to a violinist whose life depends on their body. Thomson used this thought experiment to argue that even if a fetus is a person, it does not follow that it has the right to use the mother’s body to survive. Buckles engages directly with this analogy, offering a counter-hypothetical—the “Kidnapping Mogul”—to argue that justice often requires a host to sustain a dependent life when the host is responsible for the dependent being’s condition.
Buckles structures his argument by building upon six points of common ground with Thomson, including the assumption of fetal personhood, the limited nature of the right to life, and the need for a liberal society to respect both life and bodily autonomy. However, he ultimately argues that Thomson’s logic—when fully followed—supports rather than undermines legal protections for unborn persons in the vast majority of pregnancies.
In the article’s middle sections, Buckles explores cases where pregnancies result from ineffective contraception or sexual assault. While he affirms a mother’s right to self-preservation when her life is in danger, he argues that even in cases of rape, the legal system should not presume a right to abortion. Instead, he calls for expanded institutional and financial support for pregnant individuals as a matter of justice.
Buckles also contests the philosophical principle of “strict volunteerism”—that one only has obligations when one has explicitly agreed to them—arguing that justice sometimes demands responsibility for dependent lives irrespective of consent. He invokes a principle of “equal justice” to claim that unborn persons should be treated like born persons under law if fetal personhood is assumed, as Thomson does.
The article concludes that the justness of abortion laws must be analyzed not only through rights discourse but also by considering how justice assigns duties across society. Buckles argues for a policy framework that protects unborn persons while ensuring pregnant individuals receive adequate support.
Buckles’ paper adds to a growing corpus of post-Dobbs legal scholarship and is likely to be cited in ongoing state-level debates over abortion legislation. As of early 2025, more than 20 U.S. states have passed laws that either ban or heavily restrict abortion, while others have moved to enshrine abortion rights into state constitutions or statutes.
No legal challenges have yet been filed citing Buckles’ article, but its philosophical and jurisprudential approach may influence legislative testimony, judicial reasoning, or future academic responses. The Texas Review of Law & Politics published the article in its Winter 2024 issue.
The Paper is Available at SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5212740