Justice Jackson dissents as majority grants emergency injunction in First Amendment challenge
In a 7-2 decision issued on May 20, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court granted emergency relief to Maine State Representative Laurel Libby, temporarily restoring her right to vote in the legislature after she was sanctioned for a social media post opposing transgender participation in girls’ sports. The case, Libby v. Fecteau, centers on the constitutional limits of legislative discipline and the scope of judicial intervention in statehouse disputes.
The Court’s unsigned order provides an injunction pending appeal, allowing Libby to resume her legislative duties while her case proceeds through the First Circuit and potentially returns to the Supreme Court. The decision does not reach the merits of her claims but signals skepticism about the state’s justification for disenfranchising a sitting legislator over protected speech.
Libby, who represents District 90, was censured by the Maine House and barred from speaking or voting after a February 2025 Facebook post in which she criticized a transgender athlete’s victory in the girls’ state pole vault competition. The House’s leadership demanded a public apology; when Libby refused, they invoked House rules to prohibit her from participating in any legislative votes for the remainder of her term, which runs through 2026.
Libby and six of her constituents filed suit, arguing the censure and voting ban violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and disenfranchised her district. They sought emergency relief after both the district court and the First Circuit declined to intervene, citing legislative immunity.
In her dissent, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson argued that the Court should not have intervened, warning that the applicants had not demonstrated the “critical and exigent circumstances” required for emergency relief. She emphasized the lower courts’ active consideration of the case and noted there were no imminent votes in which Libby’s participation would alter legislative outcomes.
Jackson also raised concerns that the Court was engaging in “real-time error correction” absent a clear certiorari-worthy issue. “Applicants have failed to demonstrate that their right to this relief is ‘indisputably clear,’” she wrote, citing longstanding limitations on federal courts’ ability to second-guess state legislative disciplinary actions.
The majority did not provide a detailed explanation for its decision, consistent with standard emergency docket practice. The order states that the injunction will remain in effect until the First Circuit resolves the appeal and, if sought, the Supreme Court acts on any petition for certiorari.
The dispute traces its legal foundation to Powell v. McCormack (1969), in which the Supreme Court held that Congress could not exclude a duly elected representative who met the constitutional qualifications. Libby’s counsel invoked Powell, as well as Bond v. Floyd (1966), arguing that state legislatures likewise cannot nullify a district’s representation as punishment for protected political speech.
The dissenting opinion suggested that the case raises complex, unresolved questions about the boundaries of legislative self-governance and the role of federal courts in adjudicating internal statehouse discipline. Jackson identified a range of open constitutional questions, including whether legislative ethics rules can infringe on a representative’s speech rights and whether courts may enjoin legislative employees from enforcing such sanctions.
The case will now return to the First Circuit for expedited review. If Libby and her legal team seek certiorari after that decision, the Supreme Court’s current injunction will remain in place until it either denies the petition or issues a final ruling.
A decision from the First Circuit on the underlying appeal is expected in the coming months. The Supreme Court has not indicated whether it intends to grant full review.
Another take:
So … a sitting state legislator, Laurel Libby, posts on Facebook criticizing Maine’s policy that allows transgender-identifying male athletes to compete in girls’ sports—specifically pointing out that a biologically male athlete won the girls’ state pole vault championship—and in response, the Maine House votes to censure her. But they don’t stop there. They bar her from speaking or voting on any legislation unless she publicly apologizes. That’s not just discipline—that’s enforced ideological compliance.
And now the U.S. Supreme Court has to step in, issuing an emergency injunction just so a duly elected representative can do her job. Not because she broke the law, not because she disrupted proceedings, but because she expressed a constitutionally protected opinion about fairness in women’s sports.
Meanwhile, her district—District 90—has effectively lost its voice in the state legislature until the end of her term. On every vote, instead of a “yes” or “no,” the Clerk records Libby with a “Z”, which means her vote is not counted. Not present. Not heard. Thousands of constituents, silenced by a procedural technicality designed to punish speech.
And Justice Jackson, in dissent, says there’s no “critical and exigent” reason for the Court to intervene. But if a legislator being stripped of voting rights over a Facebook post isn’t critical, what is? When public disagreement with official policy leads to political erasure, that’s not a routine matter—it’s a constitutional red flag.
This isn’t about liking or disliking what Libby said. It’s about whether elected officials can be shut down by their own chamber for expressing disfavored views on a matter of public policy. The answer, according to the Supreme Court—for now—is no. And that matters.