December ruling offers key guidance on how courts define religious organizations under employment law
In a decision issued on December 19, 2024, U.S. District Judge Michael W. Fitzgerald denied the American Society for Yad Vashem’s motion for summary judgment in a lawsuit brought by former employee Donna Yasmin Lavy, who alleges she was fired due to her pregnancy.
The court rejected the defendant’s claim that Lavy’s lawsuit was barred by the “ministerial exception” and an exemption under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) for religious corporations. The ruling clears the path for the case—which includes claims of sex discrimination, retaliation, and wrongful termination—to proceed to trial.
Though decided in late 2024, the ruling provides a useful illustration of how courts determine whether an organization qualifies as religious under federal and state employment law. The judge emphasized that a nonprofit’s association with a religiously affiliated cause, such as Holocaust remembrance, does not in itself establish religious status under the law. In assessing the American Society for Yad Vashem’s claim, the court looked at its public-facing mission, internal policies, and job functions—concluding that it operates primarily as a fundraising entity rather than a religious institution.
Lavy worked for the organization from 2016 until her termination in July 2022. In her role as Senior Development Associate and Young Leadership, she was responsible for securing donations to support Yad Vashem in Jerusalem. The court found that her position did not require religious training, convey religious messages, or involve spiritual leadership—key criteria in determining ministerial status.
“Plaintiff does not qualify as a ‘minister’ within the meaning of the ministerial exception,” Judge Fitzgerald wrote. He also noted that the organization failed to demonstrate the “clear and obvious religious characteristics” necessary to claim a religious exemption under FEHA.
The ruling does not resolve the underlying claims, but it establishes that organizations cannot shield themselves from employment lawsuits simply by citing religious affiliations. The case is now set to proceed, with trial preparations expected in 2025.
Analysis:
This case is an instructive example of how the First Amendment’s religion clauses—both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses—must be applied with surgical precision, not broad strokes.
The American Society for Yad Vashem sought to invoke the ministerial exception and California’s religious exemption to shield itself from allegations of pregnancy discrimination. But as Judge Fitzgerald correctly recognized, the ministerial exception is not a blanket immunity for any organization with a cultural or historical connection to religion. It is a narrowly tailored doctrine designed to protect a religious institution’s autonomy over the selection of individuals who perform essential religious functions.
The Supreme Court has emphasized in Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady of Guadalupe that an employee must play a central role in conveying the faith or doctrine. Here, the plaintiff was a development officer—a fundraiser—tasked with cultivating donors, not doctrine. She had no religious title, no theological duties, and no role in spiritual leadership.
Equally critical is the finding that the organization itself did not possess the requisite “clear and obvious” religious characteristics. This is where some groups miscalculate: being associated with a cause of immense moral and historical weight, such as Holocaust remembrance, does not render a secular nonprofit immune from civil rights laws. The law is clear: religious exemptions apply to organizations whose core identity is faith-based, not mission-adjacent.
The constitutional danger lies in overextending these exemptions. If courts were to accept such broad definitions of religious identity, virtually any institution could claim immunity by inserting a line about “values” into its mission statement. That would turn the ministerial exception into a constitutional loophole large enough to drive discrimination through.
Judge Fitzgerald was right to keep the exception within its constitutional bounds. The case will now go forward on its merits, as it should.
Link to decision: https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cacd.903490/gov.uscourts.cacd.903490.43.0.pdf