Court rejects Free Exercise claim, says law does not privilege secular reasons for abortion over religious ones
A federal judge has ruled that South Carolina’s abortion ban does not violate the religious freedom of physicians who seek to perform abortions in accordance with their religious beliefs, citing the state’s legitimate interests in fetal and maternal health and finding the law to be neutral and generally applicable.
In a May 7, 2025 decision, U.S. District Judge Richard M. Gergel dismissed the Free Exercise Clause claim brought by five doctors challenging the state’s post-heartbeat abortion ban, which includes limited exceptions for rape, incest, life-threatening maternal health conditions, and fatal fetal anomalies. The plaintiffs argued that the law allows abortions for certain secular reasons, such as a non-viable pregnancy or medical emergency, but not for religious reasons, and therefore infringes on their constitutional rights.
The court disagreed, stating that accepting the plaintiffs’ position would mean recognizing abortion itself as a religious practice protected by the First Amendment. The judge found the argument “unpersuasive,” emphasizing that South Carolina’s law does not single out religious conduct, nor does it provide exemptions that privilege secular motivations over religious ones.
“The State has a legitimate interest in both fetal and maternal health and exercised its plenary authority in enacting legislation that considers these interests,” Judge Gergel wrote, referencing Planned Parenthood South Atlantic v. State, 882 S.E.2d 770, 783 (S.C. 2023). The opinion pointed to Supreme Court precedent in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), which held that laws not targeting religion and applied uniformly are not subject to strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause.
The plaintiffs had argued that by permitting abortions under certain exceptions—such as preserving a woman’s physical health—but not under religiously motivated circumstances, the law inherently favored secular over religious decision-making. But the court concluded that the ban applied equally to “individuals of all religions” and did not provide any individualized exemption process that would trigger heightened constitutional scrutiny.
With this ruling, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ religious freedom claim with prejudice. However, the case will proceed on separate grounds, as Judge Gergel declined to dismiss their challenge to the law’s vagueness under the Due Process Clause. That claim argues the law’s exceptions are too ambiguously worded to provide doctors with adequate legal guidance.
No further hearings have been scheduled, and the state is expected to continue defending the statute’s constitutionality.