In Anonymous Plaintiffs 1-5 v. The State of Indiana, the Indiana Supreme Court recently declined to hear an appeal concerning whether the state’s near-total abortion ban violates the Indiana Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), thereby allowing a preliminary injunction to remain in place for the plaintiffs involved.
This decision permits the case to proceed in the lower courts, where plaintiffs argue that the abortion ban infringes upon their religious beliefs, as certain faiths permit or mandate abortion under specific circumstances. However, a thorough examination of legal precedents, including decisions on public health, anti-discrimination, and child welfare, indicates that Indiana’s position aligns with constitutional principles and serves the broader societal interest in maintaining a coherent legal framework.
The challenges to Indiana’s law, though grounded in significant constitutional protections, risk being misapplied to advance ideological objectives that extend beyond RFRA’s intended scope. The state holds a legitimate interest in regulating abortion, and its law, while controversial, does not unconstitutionally burden religious practices under prevailing legal standards.
The Legal and Ethical Basis for Indiana’s Position
1. Protecting Life as a Compelling State Interest
Central to Indiana’s defense is the assertion that protecting fetal life constitutes a compelling state interest. Courts have long recognized the state’s authority to regulate actions that directly impact the welfare of others. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905), the Supreme Court upheld the state’s authority to impose mandatory vaccinations, emphasizing that individual liberty is not absolute when it endangers others. Similarly, in cases involving Jehovah’s Witnesses refusing blood transfusions for their children, courts have consistently prioritized the state’s interest in safeguarding minors’ health and well-being over parental religious objections.
While the context of public health differs from abortion, the underlying principle remains: the state has a responsibility to protect vulnerable populations. Indiana’s abortion ban aligns with this principle, viewing the fetus as a life entitled to protection under the law. The state’s interest in fetal life transcends specific religious ideologies and reflects a secular determination about the value of potential life, akin to the state’s role in safeguarding children in medical treatment cases.
2. Neutral Laws of General Applicability
In Employment Division v. Smith (1990), the Supreme Court held that neutral, generally applicable laws do not violate the First Amendment simply because they burden religious practices. The decision clarified that the government need not accommodate every religious objection if doing so would undermine the rule of law. Similarly, in Reynolds v. United States (1878), the Court upheld federal anti-polygamy laws, rejecting a Mormon claim that the laws infringed upon religious freedom. The Court reasoned that while religious beliefs are protected, religious practices that conflict with neutral laws may be restricted.
Indiana’s abortion ban is precisely such a neutral law–it applies uniformly, without targeting or favoring any particular religious group. The plaintiffs’ argument that the ban imposes a specific religious framework fails to account for its neutrality. The law does not require adherence to any religious belief; rather, it establishes a general prohibition rooted in secular considerations about the value of fetal life. Religious objections to the law, while sincere, do not transform it into a religious imposition.
3. Preventing Pretextual Use of RFRA
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act was designed to protect genuine religious practices from unnecessary government interference. However, its application must be carefully scrutinized to prevent misuse as a pretext for ideological challenges to laws of general applicability. In City of Boerne v. Flores (1997), the Supreme Court ruled that RFRA could not be used to exempt religious organizations from generally applicable zoning laws, emphasizing the importance of judicial restraint in applying the statute.
For example, while some faiths, such as Judaism, prioritize the health of the mother over the fetus in specific circumstances, this does not establish abortion as a universal religious obligation. The plaintiffs’ claim that the law burdens their religious exercise risks conflating deeply personal decisions with doctrinal mandates. Courts must distinguish between legitimate religious practices and attempts to use RFRA as a vehicle for advancing policy goals that could not otherwise succeed through legislative or judicial means.
4. Anti-Discrimination and the Rule of Law
In cases involving anti-discrimination laws, courts have often prioritized neutral enforcement over religious objections. For instance, in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission (2018), the Court underscored the necessity of neutrality in the application of laws affecting religion. Similarly, in cases where landlords or businesses refused service to LGBTQ+ individuals based on religious beliefs, courts have upheld anti-discrimination laws as serving a compelling state interest.
The Indiana abortion ban reflects a similar principle: it serves a compelling state interest and applies neutrally without targeting any specific religious group. Allowing religious exemptions to undermine such laws risks eroding the integrity of the legal system and enabling selective compliance based on subjective claims of faith.
5. Upholding Democratic Principles
Indiana’s abortion ban represents the culmination of a democratic process, reflecting the will of its electorate and legislature. While the law’s critics contend that it disregards minority religious views, a functioning democracy must balance respect for individual rights with the need for collective governance. Allowing religious exemptions to undermine broadly supported laws risks creating a patchwork legal system where compliance depends on individual belief, as seen in unsuccessful challenges to vaccine mandates like those in Jacobson and subsequent COVID-19 cases.
Moreover, the judiciary’s role is not to act as a super-legislature but to ensure that laws adhere to constitutional principles. Indiana’s law, grounded in secular reasoning and applied uniformly, meets this standard. By upholding the law, the courts affirm the state’s authority to regulate contentious issues within the bounds of constitutional protections.
Conclusion: Preserving the Balance Between Liberty and Law
The challenges to Indiana’s abortion ban under RFRA raise important questions about the scope of religious liberty in a pluralistic society. While religious freedom is a cornerstone of American democracy, it is not an unlimited right. The state’s compelling interest in protecting fetal life, combined with the law’s neutrality and general applicability, justifies its enforcement even in the face of religious objections.
