Author: ReligiousLiberty.TV

  • General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists Files Lawsuit to Defend Hiring Practices

    General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists Files Lawsuit to Defend Hiring Practices

    On October 2, 2024, the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists (GC), together with Adventist Risk Management (ARM), filed a verified complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. This legal action raises important questions about the intersection of religious freedom and employment law, particularly concerning the ability of religious organizations to make hiring decisions in alignment with their religious beliefs. The case, General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists v. Cleveland L. Horton, II, challenges a reinterpretation of the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act (MFEPA) that threatens the religious autonomy of organizations like the Seventh-day Adventist Church.

    Nature of the Case

    At the heart of the lawsuit is the plaintiffs’ assertion that Maryland’s current interpretation of employment law infringes on their First Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs argue that the state’s application of MFEPA, following a 2023 ruling by the Maryland Supreme Court in Doe v. Catholic Relief Services, improperly restricts their ability to hire only Seventh-day Adventists for positions within their organizations. The GC and ARM claim that this restriction violates their religious liberty by interfering with their constitutionally protected autonomy to make employment decisions based on faith.

    According to the complaint, the plaintiffs contend that the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses should protect their right to ensure that all employees adhere to and uphold the Seventh-day Adventist faith, regardless of their specific job duties. They also argue that Maryland’s legal framework, as currently applied, would require secular courts to assess religious doctrine to determine which positions further the religious mission of an organization, a practice that would lead to excessive entanglement of church and state.

    Background on the Seventh-day Adventist Church

    The Seventh-day Adventist Church, one of the most racially and ethnically diverse Christian denominations worldwide, traces its origins to a religious revival movement in the 1840s. Officially established in 1863, the church has grown to over 22 million members globally, with ministries spanning education, healthcare, and humanitarian aid. Central to the church’s mission is a commitment to sharing the teachings of the Bible and preparing believers for eternal life with Christ.

    The General Conference, the church’s highest governing body, plays a vital role in overseeing the administration of the church’s global operations, including the management of personnel who carry out the church’s work. ARM, on the other hand, provides insurance and risk management services to Adventist ministries worldwide. Both organizations maintain that hiring individuals who share their faith is crucial to advancing the church’s mission.

    The Legal Conflict: MFEPA and the Doe v. Catholic Relief Services Decision

    For many years, MFEPA, Maryland’s anti-discrimination law, included a broad religious exemption, allowing religious organizations to hire based on faith without fear of violating state law. However, in 2023, the Maryland Supreme Court reinterpreted this exemption in Doe v. Catholic Relief Services, significantly narrowing its scope. The court held that the exemption applies only to employees whose jobs directly further the “core” religious mission of the organization. This decision means that roles deemed by a court to be non-religious, such as janitorial or administrative positions, would not qualify for the exemption, even if the organization requires those employees to adhere to religious beliefs.

    This reinterpretation, according to the plaintiffs, leaves them vulnerable to legal action if they continue to require all employees to be members of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, regardless of job function. Under this new standard, even positions like a building services technician would no longer be protected under the religious exemption, exposing the GC and ARM to liability if they refuse to hire individuals who do not share their faith.

    Claims for Relief: First Amendment Violations

    The plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that the application of MFEPA, as reinterpreted by the Maryland Supreme Court, violates multiple constitutional protections. These include:

    Church Autonomy (First Amendment Religion Clauses): The plaintiffs argue that MFEPA unlawfully interferes with their ability to make internal religious decisions, such as determining which employees are qualified to work within their organization based on faith. They claim that the law intrudes on the church’s governance by forcing secular courts to decide what constitutes the church’s “core mission” and which roles further that mission (Complaint, pp. 20-21).

    Excessive Entanglement (First Amendment Establishment Clause): The plaintiffs assert that MFEPA results in excessive entanglement between church and state by requiring secular courts to interpret religious doctrine and assess which job functions are essential to the church’s mission. This entanglement, they argue, violates the Establishment Clause, which mandates the separation of church and state (Complaint, pp. 21-22).

    Denominational Discrimination (First Amendment Establishment Clause): The plaintiffs also claim that the reinterpreted MFEPA discriminates against religious organizations with broader understandings of their mission. Religious groups that see all employees as integral to their faith mission, regardless of job title, are disadvantaged compared to those that limit faith-based hiring to religious or pastoral roles (Complaint, pp. 26-27).

    Free Exercise of Religion (First Amendment): The plaintiffs contend that MFEPA’s current application burdens their religious exercise by restricting their ability to hire employees who share their faith. They argue that this burden is not justified by a compelling government interest and, therefore, fails to meet the strict scrutiny standard required when laws restrict religious freedom (Complaint, pp. 23-25).

    Expressive Association and Right of Assembly (First Amendment): The complaint further claims that MFEPA infringes on the plaintiffs’ right to expressive association by compelling them to employ individuals who do not share their religious beliefs. They argue that this forced association dilutes their religious message and undermines their ability to create a community of believers dedicated to carrying out the church’s mission (Complaint, pp. 28-30).

    The Broader Implications

    This case could set a significant precedent for religious organizations across the United States. If the plaintiffs succeed, the decision could reaffirm the broad protections religious groups have historically enjoyed in making faith-based employment decisions. A ruling in favor of the General Conference and ARM would likely strengthen the autonomy of religious institutions to define their own missions and determine which employees are necessary to fulfill them without interference from the state.

    However, if the court upholds Maryland’s current interpretation of MFEPA, it could signal a shift toward more restrictive interpretations of religious exemptions in employment law. Such a ruling could open the door for increased government oversight of religious organizations’ hiring practices, potentially forcing them to justify their employment decisions based on secular standards of job function rather than their religious beliefs.

  • Why Free Speech is Key to Religious Liberty

    Why Free Speech is Key to Religious Liberty

    [dc]F[/dc]ree speech and religious liberty are deeply connected. In fact, you can’t have true religious freedom without free speech. The ability to express one’s beliefs openly, to question or challenge ideas, and to share one’s faith is essential to practicing religion. But in today’s world, free speech is under threat, not just by governments but also by social media companies, which sometimes censor certain viewpoints. When speech is limited, especially when it comes to religious ideas, religious liberty is at risk.

    The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects both free speech and the free exercise of religion. It ensures that individuals can speak openly about their beliefs and practice their faith without government interference. Whether someone wants to share their religious views with friends, write a blog post, or lead a congregation, they have the right to do so. This freedom fosters religious diversity and allows people to live according to their conscience.

    However, there have been attempts to limit this freedom, even in the United States. For instance, social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube have been criticized for removing or limiting content that they deem controversial. While these companies are private businesses and can set their own rules, their decisions often have real consequences for religious expression. In some cases, posts discussing certain religious beliefs or defending traditional views on issues like marriage or morality have been removed or restricted. This type of censorship, even if not directly from the government, can have a chilling effect on free speech and religious liberty.

    Consider the example of a Christian group that posted Bible verses on social media platforms, only to find their posts flagged or removed for violating “community guidelines.” While the companies claim to be fighting hate speech, these actions can sometimes cross the line into censoring legitimate religious expression. When voices are silenced, particularly when they’re expressing deeply held beliefs, it creates an atmosphere where only certain views are allowed to be heard.

    History also shows us how dangerous censorship can be. In the past, governments have used censorship to suppress religious minorities. For example, during the early 20th century, Jehovah’s Witnesses faced bans on their literature and speech because their beliefs were seen as controversial. These efforts to limit their free speech were also attacks on their religious freedom.

    The lesson here is clear: if we allow free speech to be restricted–whether by the government or private companies–religious liberty will also suffer. When people are afraid to speak openly about their beliefs, it becomes harder for them to practice their religion freely. Everyone, no matter their faith, should have the right to express their views without fear of being censored.

    In the United States, protecting both free speech and religious liberty is essential for a healthy, diverse society. Censorship, especially when it limits religious expression, threatens the very core of these freedoms. If we are to uphold the principles of a free society, we must ensure that everyone has the right to speak and practice their faith without interference.

  • Justices Decline Abortion Law Case, Spotlighting Federal-State Conflict

    Justices Decline Abortion Law Case, Spotlighting Federal-State Conflict

    [dc]I[/dc]n June, the Supreme Court reversed its grant of certiorari and decided not to hear a case involving a major conflict between federal and state abortion laws. In Moyle v. United States (No. 23–726), the dispute centers on whether the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) overrides Idaho’s strict abortion law. EMTALA is a federal law that requires hospitals to provide emergency care to anyone in need, regardless of their ability to pay. In cases where a pregnant woman faces a serious health emergency, EMTALA mandates that hospitals provide treatment necessary to stabilize her condition. This can include performing an abortion if it is needed to protect her health, even if her life is not in immediate danger. However, Idaho’s abortion law is far more restrictive, allowing abortions only if the woman’s life is at risk, and not when the threat is merely to her health.

    The conflict between the two laws led the federal government to sue Idaho, arguing that EMTALA preempts the state’s restrictive abortion law. A lower court agreed, issuing an injunction to prevent Idaho from enforcing its law in situations where EMTALA would require an abortion to stabilize a woman’s health. Idaho appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, asking the justices to intervene. Initially, the Court granted certiorari, indicating that it would hear the case. However, after further consideration, the Court decided to dismiss the writ as “improvidently granted,” meaning the justices chose not to hear the case after all. This leaves the lower court’s injunction in place, meaning Idaho’s abortion law cannot be enforced in circumstances where EMTALA applies.

    The Supreme Court’s decision not to hear the case was met with disagreement from some of the justices. Justice Alito, joined by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch, dissented, arguing that the Court should have resolved the issue. In his dissent, Justice Alito emphasized that EMTALA does not explicitly require hospitals to perform abortions and that the law mandates the protection of both the pregnant woman and her unborn child. He criticized the majority for avoiding what he saw as a straightforward issue of statutory interpretation. Alito also expressed concern that by not addressing the case now, the Court was allowing uncertainty to persist about how federal and state laws on abortion should be reconciled. He argued that Idaho had a strong likelihood of success on the merits and that the federal government’s interpretation of EMTALA was flawed, particularly because the law never explicitly mentions abortion.

    By declining to hear Moyle v. United States this term, the Supreme Court has left the issue unresolved for now, sending the case back to the lower courts to continue the legal battle. For the time being, hospitals in Idaho must follow EMTALA’s requirements, even if it means providing abortions in cases where the state’s law would otherwise prohibit them. This decision is one of several significant cases that the Supreme Court opted not to hear in the new term, leaving open questions about the future of abortion law in the post-Dobbs era.

    TLDR: The Supreme Court has declined to hear Moyle v. United States (No. 23–726), a case involving the conflict between Idaho’s restrictive abortion law and the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA). The case questions whether EMTALA, which requires hospitals to provide emergency care, including abortions to protect a woman’s health, preempts Idaho’s law allowing abortions only to prevent death. The Court’s decision leaves the lower court’s injunction in place, preventing Idaho from enforcing its law where it conflicts with EMTALA. Dissenting justices argued that the case presented important unresolved legal issues.

  • Academic Review: Separation of Church and Business: A Look at Corporate Disestablishment

    Academic Review: Separation of Church and Business: A Look at Corporate Disestablishment

    In his Virginia Law Review article “Corporate Disestablishment,” 105 Va. L. Rev. 595 (2019), James D. Nelson explores the legal complexities of corporate religion and advocates for clear boundaries between a company’s religious practices and its employees’ rights. Addressing the increasing trend of businesses integrating religious beliefs into their operations–particularly after the Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby–Nelson argues that principles such as freedom of conscience, non-domination, and mutual respect should limit corporate religiosity to protect employees from being coerced into religious practices they do not share.

    Nelson, an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Houston Law Center specializing in constitutional law and the intersections of private law and public values, brings a nuanced perspective to this issue. His scholarship often examines how constitutional principles apply within private sector contexts, including the relationship between corporations and religious freedom.

    Nelson’s argument gains traction when considered alongside real-world examples. Take Hobby Lobby: the company refused to cover contraception in its employee healthcare plans due to its religious beliefs. Although the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the corporation, Nelson cautions against such unchecked corporate religious authority. He highlights the potential for corporations to impose their religious agendas on employees, creating environments where workers might feel pressured to conform to religious norms to maintain their employment.

    Tyson Foods offers another example. The company publicly states that it strives to “honor God” in its corporate values. While this may seem benign, Nelson would argue that if Tyson Foods required employees to attend religious meetings or included spiritual assessments in performance evaluations, it would cross the line into impermissible corporate religion. Similarly, companies like Chick-fil-A, known for closing on Sundays for religious reasons, prompt discussions about whether such practices in corporate settings affect employees’ working rights, particularly those who do not share the same beliefs.

    Nelson also addresses more subtle forms of religious favoritism in the workplace. In some small businesses, especially in conservative regions, religious employees may be promoted more frequently or evaluated based on their participation in company-wide religious activities. Even when religious conformity is not officially mandated, subtle pressures can create a work environment that excludes non-believers or those of other faiths, mirroring the legal cases Nelson examines.

    In addition to his legal analysis, Nelson proposes adopting principles from the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause and applying them to the private sector. This approach suggests that businesses should not impose religious authority in the workplace, just as the government cannot establish a state religion.

  • Indiana Federal Court Holds Teaching of Evolution Does Not Violate Establishment Clause

    Indiana Federal Court Holds Teaching of Evolution Does Not Violate Establishment Clause

    In a recent case, Reinoehl v. Penn-Harris-Madison School Corporation, the plaintiffs, Jennifer, Jason, and Sarah Reinoehl, challenged the teaching of evolutionary theory in Indiana public schools. They argued that the state’s mandate to teach evolution violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and Article 1, Section 3 of the Indiana Constitution. The court ultimately dismissed the case, but the arguments on both sides are worth examining.

    The Plaintiffs’ Argument

    The Reinoehls contended that teaching evolution, particularly in public schools, promotes atheism under the guise of science. They asserted that evolution is a belief system akin to religion and that its inclusion in the curriculum violated the constitutional prohibition on government establishment of religion. Their complaint emphasized that teaching evolution without presenting other creation narratives was unfairly biased against religious worldviews, particularly their own Judeo-Christian beliefs.

    The plaintiffs sought relief in the form of injunctive measures, asking that the teaching of evolution be stopped or, at the very least, that it be accompanied by instruction on other religious perspectives regarding the origin of life. They also requested monetary damages, citing the harm done to their children who had been exposed to these teachings.

    The Defendants’ Position

    The defendants, including the Penn-Harris-Madison School Corporation and Indiana’s Secretary of Education, argued that the teaching of evolution is not a religious practice but rather a well-established scientific theory. They maintained that evolution is a fundamental component of biological science and that its teaching does not promote atheism. Instead, they claimed that evolution education follows established educational guidelines, and presenting it as part of the science curriculum does not violate constitutional protections.

    They also contended that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the case because no ongoing harm was being done to their children, many of whom had already completed the courses in question. Furthermore, they argued that the case was moot as the plaintiffs’ children were no longer in the public school system.

    The Court’s Decision

    The court sided with the defendants, granting the motion to dismiss the case. It ruled that teaching evolution does not establish a religion, as it is not a religious belief but a scientific theory supported by extensive evidence. The court referenced precedent, including Epperson v. Arkansas and Edwards v. Aguillard, which held that teaching evolution in public schools does not violate the Establishment Clause.

    Additionally, the court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing for injunctive relief because their children were no longer attending the schools in question, and thus there was no imminent harm. While the parents argued that they intended to enroll their youngest child in the public school system, the court found this insufficient to establish standing.

  • Religious Parents Appeal to Supreme Court Over Opt-Out Rights on Gender and Sexuality Education

    Religious Parents Appeal to Supreme Court Over Opt-Out Rights on Gender and Sexuality Education

    [dc]R[/dc]]eligious parents in Montgomery County, Maryland, have appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court to reinstate their right to opt their children out of lessons on gender and sexuality. The case, Mahmoud v. Taylor, brings a legal challenge to the Montgomery County Board of Education’s decision to deny parents the ability to exempt their children from exposure to storybooks that include topics such as gender transitions and same-sex relationships.

    The controversy stems from a reversal in the school board’s policy. Initially, parents were allowed to opt their children out of specific lessons dealing with gender identity, aligning with Maryland law that permits opt-outs from family life and human sexuality instruction. However, in 2023, the board announced that parents would no longer be informed when these lessons were taking place, nor could they opt out their children from this instruction.

    The Parents’ Argument

    The group of parents behind the lawsuit includes families from various religious backgrounds, including Islam, Christianity, and Eastern Orthodoxy. Represented by the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, the parents argue that the school’s policy violates their First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. They claim that the lessons, which include books like Pride Puppy and Born Ready, directly contradict their faith, which teaches traditional views of gender and sexuality.

    Tamer Mahmoud, one of the lead plaintiffs, expressed concern over the potential impact of these lessons on young, impressionable children. “Our faith teaches that biological sex is a gift from God,” Mahmoud said. “These lessons introduce concepts that conflict with our deeply held beliefs, and we believe parents should have the right to decide if their children are ready to engage with such ideas.”

    The plaintiffs are not seeking to ban the curriculum altogether but are asking the court to restore the previous policy that allowed parents to choose whether their children would participate in these lessons.

    The School Board’s Position

    The Montgomery County Board of Education has defended its decision, asserting that the curriculum is intended to promote inclusivity and foster a supportive environment for LGBTQ+ students. In public statements, board members argued that allowing opt-outs would undermine these efforts and create a segregated environment within the classroom, where some students may feel alienated.

    Board members have also pushed back against the parents’ claims, with some likening the opposition to the curriculum to other forms of discrimination. At school board meetings, where hundreds of parents have protested the policy, some board members compared the demands for opt-outs to the promotion of “hate” and “exclusion.”

    Legal Questions Before the Court

    The legal question at the heart of this case is whether denying parents the right to opt out their children from lessons that conflict with their religious beliefs constitutes a violation of the First Amendment’s free exercise clause. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the school board, reasoning that the policy does not impose a substantial burden on the parents’ religious exercise, since parents are still free to discuss these topics with their children outside of school.

    However, the parents argue that this ruling overlooks the compulsory nature of public education and that their children are being exposed to ideas that are at odds with their faith, without parental consent. They contend that this violates their right to control the religious upbringing of their children–a principle previously upheld by the Supreme Court in the landmark Wisconsin v. Yoder case, which allowed Amish parents to withdraw their children from public school due to religious concerns.

    In Mahmoud v. Taylor, the parents argue that the school board’s refusal to allow opt-outs forces them into an untenable situation: either they violate their religious beliefs or withdraw their children from public schools entirely.

    The Court is expected to announce in the coming months whether it will take up the case, potentially setting the stage for a new chapter in the debate over religious freedom in public education.

  • 9th Circuit Upholds Religious Exemption to Title IX in LGBTQ+ Discrimination Case

    9th Circuit Upholds Religious Exemption to Title IX in LGBTQ+ Discrimination Case

     

    The 9th Circuit has ruled that religious colleges can continue to claim exemptions from Title IX, allowing gender-based discrimination in alignment with religious beliefs.

    [dc]T[/dc]he U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the dismissal of a case brought by LGBTQ+ students against the U.S. Department of Education. The students argued that the religious exemption to Title IX, which allows federally funded religious institutions to discriminate based on gender, violated their rights under the First and Fifth Amendments. Title IX is a federal law that prohibits sex-based discrimination in federally funded schools, but it includes an exemption for institutions whose religious tenets conflict with the law. The court found that the exemption does not violate the Establishment Clause or equal protection rights and affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss the case.

    The case, Hunter v. U.S. Department of Education, involved 40 LGBTQ+ students who attended or applied to religious colleges. They alleged that they faced discrimination based on their gender identity or sexual orientation, ranging from rejection of admissions to rescission of enrollment. The plaintiffs challenged the Title IX exemption, asserting it sanctioned discrimination under the guise of religious freedom, thus violating constitutional protections.

    The panel, led by Circuit Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr., ruled that the exemption has a historical basis and does not establish a religion or unfairly target LGBTQ+ students. The panel also held that the exemption survived intermediate scrutiny, applied to cases involving potential discrimination. According to the court, the exemption serves a legitimate purpose of protecting religious freedom. It only applies to institutions where enforcing Title IX would conflict with the religious beliefs of the controlling organization.

    A Historic and Ongoing Debate

    At the heart of the court’s decision is a balancing act between the rights of LGBTQ+ individuals and the free exercise of religion. The plaintiffs argued that the religious exemption to Title IX effectively legalized discrimination by allowing institutions to avoid compliance with laws designed to protect marginalized groups. They sought to invalidate the exemption, claiming it violated the Establishment Clause by privileging religious institutions at the expense of their rights.

    However, the court found that religious exemptions have a long history in American law, pointing to historical practices dating back to the Founding Era. The court referenced Supreme Court decisions that have upheld similar exemptions, including tax breaks for religious institutions. In its decision, the court emphasized that such exemptions are part of a broader tradition of accommodating religious practice in ways that do not violate the Constitution.

    The ruling also addressed the plaintiffs’ claim that the exemption violates equal protection guarantees. The court noted that while LGBTQ+ students may face discrimination, the exemption is narrowly tailored to protect religious institutions from government interference in their exercise of religion. The court stressed that the exemption does not grant a blanket license to discriminate but only applies when enforcing Title IX would directly conflict with religious beliefs.

     

    Hunter v. U.S. Department of Education (Decided August 30, 2024)

    Decision: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/08/30/23-35174.pdf

  • Justice for the Unborn: The Court Decision That Forced California to Rewrite Its Murder Laws

    Justice for the Unborn: The Court Decision That Forced California to Rewrite Its Murder Laws

    In 1970, the California Supreme Court’s decision in Keeler v. Superior Court sent shockwaves through the legal community and the public alike. The court ruled that a viable fetus was not considered a “human being” under California’s murder statute, Penal Code § 187. This ruling not only highlighted the limitations of judicial interpretation but also prompted swift legislative action to amend the statute. This article explores the background, legal reasoning, and legislative response to the Keeler decision.

    The case began with a tragic incident involving Robert Harrison Keeler and his ex-wife, Teresa Keeler. In February 1969, Robert Keeler assaulted Teresa, who was pregnant by another man, causing the death of her viable fetus. Keeler was charged with murder under California Penal Code § 187, which defines murder as “the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.”

    The central question in Keeler v. Superior Court was whether a viable fetus could be classified as a “human being” within the meaning of the murder statute. In a majority opinion written by Justice Stanley Mosk, the court concluded that the Legislature did not intend for the term “human being” to include fetuses when the statute was enacted in 1872.

    The court’s analysis began with an examination of the common law understanding of “human being” at the time the statute was enacted. Historically, common law did not recognize a fetus as a separate legal entity for the purposes of homicide. Influential legal authorities, such as Sir Edward Coke and William Blackstone, maintained that a person must be born alive to be considered a victim of homicide. This was, of course, before prenatal imaging, modern abortion and surgeries gave insight into what was happening in the womb.

    Justice Mosk claimed that the Legislature’s intent in 1872 was to align with the common law interpretation. The murder statute, taken verbatim from the Crimes and Punishments Act of 1850, did not include any language suggesting that fetuses were to be considered “human beings” for the purposes of the law. The court inferred that the Legislature, by not amending the statute to include fetuses, actually intended to exclude them from the definition of murder.

    The court also addressed the constitutional principle of due process, particularly the aspect of fair warning. Extending the definition of “human being” to include viable fetuses would constitute an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of the statute, effectively criminalizing conduct that was not previously defined as murder. This would violate the principle of fair warning, a core component of due process, which requires laws to be clear and not applied retroactively.

    The California legislature reacted swiftly to the Keeler decision. On the very next working day after the decision, the majority floor leader of the Assembly publicly denounced the ruling. Despite being more than halfway through the legislative session and past the deadline for introducing new bills, the legislature took extraordinary steps to address the issue quickly.

    Assembly Bill No. 816, originally on a different subject, was repurposed. Its original text was deleted and replaced with the new version of Section 187. The bill went through multiple amendments and committee hearings in both houses, passing in just eight weeks. The amended statute now reads: “Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought.”The primary intent of this amendment was to directly address the situation in the Keeler case, making it possible to charge individuals like Robert Keeler with murder for killing a fetus.

    The Scott Peterson case is a modern example of the application of this rule. Peterson was charged with special circumstances double homicide for killing both his pregnant wife, Laci, and their unborn child in 2002 and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Had Laci Peterson intended to abort the same child at the same gestational stage, the state of California may have even paid for the procedure.

    Keeler v. Superior Court remains a landmark case in California’s legal history, and the California legislature’s response to amend Penal Code § 187 clarified the definition of murder, bifurcating the rights of those destined for abortion from those destined to live.

  • Ohio Enacts Law Expanding Religious Accommodations in Public Schools

    Ohio Enacts Law Expanding Religious Accommodations in Public Schools

    COLUMBUS, Ohio – Ohio has enacted the Religious Expression Days or “R.E.D.” Act (House Bill 214) mandating broader accommodations for students’ religious practices in the state’s public schools.

    The legislation, signed into law in July by Governor Mike DeWine, requires all Ohio public school districts to adopt policies that “reasonably accommodate the sincerely held religious beliefs and practices of individual students.” A key provision allows students to take up to three “religious expression days” per school year without academic penalty.

    [perfectpullquote align=”right” bordertop=”false” cite=”” link=”” color=”blue” class=”” size=”18″]Key Provisions:
    • Students can take up to 3 religious expression days per year
    • Schools must provide alternative accommodations for missed work
    • Principals must approve requests without inquiring into religious sincerity
    • Schools must post accommodation policies and a list of major religious holidays online
    • Accommodations not limited to holidays on the posted list[/perfectpullquote]

    “The policy shall permit a student in any of grades kindergarten through twelve to be absent for up to three religious expression days each school year to take holidays for reasons of faith or religious or spiritual belief system,” the bill states. Schools must provide alternative accommodations for missed exams or assignments.

    Notably, the law instructs school principals to approve these religious absence requests “without inquiry into the sincerity of a student’s religious or spiritual belief system.” This provision aims to prevent subjective judgments about the validity of different religious practices.

    The R.E.D. Act also addresses concerns about political ideology in schools. It prohibits districts from requiring employees, job applicants, or students to “affirmatively ascribe to, or opine about, specific beliefs, affiliations, ideals, or principles concerning political movements, or ideology.” Such statements cannot be used in employee evaluations or student assessments.

    The law requires schools to post their religious accommodation policies online, along with a “nonexhaustive list of major religious holidays,” including Eid, Good Friday, Rosh Hashanah, Yom Kippur, and Passover. However, it specifies that accommodations should not be limited to listed holidays.

     

  • Liberté, Égalité, Laïcité: Secular France’s Struggle with Religious Freedom

    Liberté, Égalité, Laïcité: Secular France’s Struggle with Religious Freedom

    In the heart of Paris, a stone’s throw from Notre Dame Cathedral, a young Muslim woman adjusts her hijab before entering a university lecture hall. Across town, a Catholic priest tends to his dwindling flock in a state-owned church building. Meanwhile, in the National Assembly, lawmakers debate the latest legislation aimed at reinforcing France’s unique brand of secularism: laïcité.

    These scenes, mundane yet fraught with tension, encapsulate the complex reality of religious freedom in contemporary France. A nation that prides itself on its commitment to liberté, égalité, fraternité finds itself grappling with an increasingly diverse populace and the ghosts of its revolutionary past.

    The roots of France’s complicated relationship with religion run deep, stretching back to the tumultuous days of the 1789 Revolution. In those heady times, revolutionaries sought to dismantle the immense power of the Catholic Church, viewing it as a pillar of the oppressive ancien régime. Church lands were nationalized, clergy became state employees, and even the calendar was secularized in a sweeping attempt to remake French society.

    This revolutionary zeal left an indelible mark on the French psyche, culminating in the 1905 law separating church and state. This landmark legislation enshrined laïcité as a cornerstone of the French Republic, establishing a form of secularism far more assertive than in many other Western democracies.

    Today, laïcité remains a cherished principle, but its application in an increasingly multicultural France has become a source of controversy. The 2004 ban on conspicuous religious symbols in public schools, ostensibly applied to all faiths but primarily affecting Muslim girls wearing hijabs, marked a turning point. It ignited a debate that has only intensified in the years since, encompassing everything from burkinis on beaches to halal meals in school cafeterias.

    For supporters, these measures are necessary to maintain the neutrality of public spaces and promote social cohesion. Critics, however, see them as thinly veiled attempts to target France’s Muslim population, the largest in Western Europe. The tension between religious expression and secular ideals has become a defining feature of French political discourse, with each terrorist attack or controversy reigniting the debate.

    Yet the challenges extend beyond Islam. France’s Jewish community, despite deep roots in the country, faces rising antisemitism. New religious movements struggle against suspicion and legal hurdles. Even the once-dominant Catholic Church finds itself navigating a changed landscape, its influence waning even as its cultural significance persists.

    The contrast with the United States is stark. While both nations value religious freedom, their approaches could hardly be more different. In America, religious symbols adorn government buildings, faith-based organizations are integral to social services, and politicians routinely invoke divine guidance. France, by contrast, strives for a public sphere scrubbed clean of religious influence.[perfectpullquote align=”right” bordertop=”false” cite=”” link=”” color=”” class=”” size=””]In America, religious symbols adorn government buildings, faith-based organizations are integral to social services, and politicians routinely invoke divine guidance. France, by contrast, strives for a public sphere scrubbed clean of religious influence.[/perfectpullquote]

    This divergence stems from fundamentally different historical experiences and constitutional frameworks. The First Amendment’s twin clauses – prohibiting the establishment of religion while protecting its free exercise – have shaped an American approach that is both hands-off and protective. France’s model, forged in the crucible of revolution and anti-clericalism, seeks to relegate religion firmly to the private sphere.

    As France navigates the complexities of the 21st century, the question looms: Can laïcité evolve to accommodate a pluralistic society without losing its essence? The challenge is not merely academic. It cuts to the heart of French identity and the nation’s ability to integrate diverse populations while maintaining its core values.

    Recent legislation, such as the 2021 law against “separatism,” suggests a doubling down on the traditional interpretation of laïcité. Yet voices calling for a more nuanced approach grow louder, arguing that rigid secularism may do more to alienate than to unite.

    The coming years will be crucial in determining whether France can forge a new consensus around religious freedom and the place of faith in public life. As the nation grapples with these issues, the world watches closely. In an era of global migration and resurgent identities, France’s struggles and successes may well presage the challenges other diverse societies will face in balancing secularism, security, and religious liberty.

    The stakes are high, not just for France but for all those seeking to navigate the complex interplay of faith and citizenship in the modern world. As the bells of Notre Dame ring out over a changing Paris, they sound a call not just to prayer but to reflection on the very nature of freedom in a plural society.