Ruling allows secular organizations to claim religious exemptions—raising concerns over future legal carveouts and regulatory avoidance
Safehouse, a Philadelphia-based nonprofit formed to combat opioid overdoses, planned to open a facility where individuals could engage in supervised illegal drug use. The model, often described as harm reduction, would allow people to bring their own illegal drugs and consume them under medical supervision, with staff on hand to intervene in the event of an overdose. While such facilities exist in other countries, they are explicitly prohibited under federal law. Specifically, 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2) makes it a crime to “manage or control any place” and “knowingly and intentionally…make available for use…the place, for the purpose of unlawfully…using a controlled substance.”
In 2019, the Department of Justice sued Safehouse to prevent the site’s opening. In response, Safehouse asserted a novel defense: that the operation was an expression of religious belief, rooted in the sanctity of life and moral obligation to prevent death. The organization argued that enforcing § 856(a)(2) would substantially burden its religious exercise under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the First Amendment. The district court rejected that argument, reasoning that Safehouse was not a religious entity and thus could not claim those protections.
On July 24, 2025, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. In a precedential opinion, the court held that RFRA’s protections are not limited to entities that are formally or traditionally religious. It concluded that Safehouse, as a nonprofit corporation, qualifies as a “person” under the statute and is therefore eligible to assert a religious liberty claim—even if it was not organized for religious purposes and does not identify as a religious institution.
This ruling builds directly on the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., which held that closely held for-profit corporations could assert religious freedom claims under RFRA. Citing the Dictionary Act, the Third Circuit emphasized that the term “person” includes corporations and associations, and that there is no statutory basis to exclude nonprofits without formal religious status. “RFRA applies to ‘a person’s’ exercise of religion,” the court wrote. “Safehouse is a ‘person’ claiming to exercise religion, so it is eligible for RFRA’s protections.”
The decision does not resolve whether Safehouse’s belief system qualifies as religious, whether its claimed motivations are sincere, or whether the federal statute imposes a substantial burden on that exercise. Those questions were remanded to the district court for further litigation. But the appellate ruling removes a major legal barrier: the idea that only explicitly religious organizations can invoke RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause.
The consequences of this doctrinal shift may extend far beyond the facts of this case. By holding that a nonprofit providing supervised illegal drug use is entitled to pursue religious protections, the court has widened the field for similar claims by entities that are not religious in their structure or public identity. This author notes that this creates a path for otherwise secular corporations and nonprofits to assert “religious motivation” as a defense against a variety of generally applicable laws.
That could mean not just exemptions in the context of harm reduction or public health, but also in employment practices, provision of services, and regulatory compliance. A secular business could, for example, claim a religious belief as justification for refusing to hire unmarried pregnant individuals, declining service to same-sex couples, or opting out of environmental or labor regulations.
Because RFRA protections are triggered by the subjective belief of the claimant and not the objective religious identity of the organization, the ruling opens the door to challenges in courts where institutional purpose and religious authenticity are difficult to assess. Courts are now likely to face more threshold litigation over whether claimed beliefs are “religious” in nature and whether they are sincerely held by entities whose documents, governance, and operations do not otherwise reflect such beliefs.
The Third Circuit acknowledged that sincerity remains a gating issue, and that “corporate giants” are unlikely to bring such claims. But it offered no standard for distinguishing religiously expressive organizations from those asserting convenience-based motivations under a religious label. Without additional limits or statutory clarification, RFRA may now function as a general-purpose exemption mechanism—not only for churches or ministries, but for a broad spectrum of private organizations operating under secular charters.
As the case returns to district court, judges will be asked to determine whether Safehouse’s religious claim is credible, and whether the threat of prosecution imposes a burden substantial enough to trigger RFRA’s protections.
Ruling:
United States v. Safehouse, (3d Cir., July 24, 2025
https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/242027p.pdf