Judge allows negligent supervision claim to proceed, raising questions about employee protections at religious institutions
On June 5, 2025, a federal judge in Minnesota partially dismissed the employment discrimination lawsuit of Rolanda Schmidt, a former professor at the University of Northwestern–St. Paul, ruling that her Title VII claim is barred by the ministerial exception under the First Amendment.
The court found that although Schmidt taught secular subjects like accounting, her role at the private Christian university qualified her as a “minister” due to the institution’s explicit religious expectations for faculty. According to the ruling, all university professors were considered ministers of the gospel and tasked with discipling students intellectually and spiritually—a framework Schmidt acknowledged and participated in throughout her employment.
The ruling comes amid growing judicial scrutiny over how far religious employers can go in invoking the ministerial exception. While the court applied the exception to Schmidt’s Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims, it declined to rule on her separate state law claim of negligent supervision, stating that more discovery is needed to determine whether that claim also implicates ecclesiastical matters.
Schmidt, who joined the University in 2017, alleged that she was subject to racial and gender-based discrimination, intimidation, and retaliation, including exposure to a hate crime involving a racial slur written on her vehicle. She claimed that university officials, including named colleagues, failed to respond adequately to her complaints and that her integration of Christian themes into her courses was compelled rather than voluntary.
The University argued that Schmidt was hired explicitly as a religious instructor, citing her job description and syllabi, which included prayers, devotional readings, and Christian perspectives. The court agreed, noting that the evidence showed Schmidt engaged in activities aligned with the University’s religious mission—even if she later claimed to have done so under pressure.
“Even viewing all the evidence in Schmidt’s favor, no reasonable jury could side with Schmidt’s version of events,” Judge John R. Tunheim wrote in the opinion. “What an employee does involves what an employee is entrusted to do, not simply what acts an employee chooses to perform.”
The decision aligns with the Supreme Court’s guidance in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U.S. 732 (2020), where the Court extended the ministerial exception to lay teachers in religious schools who were responsible for conveying faith principles. It also underscores how courts are continuing to interpret the breadth of that exception when applied to employees performing secular job functions within faith-based institutions.
Still, the court flagged concerns about the breadth of the doctrine. “The Court is deeply concerned about overbreadth,” Judge Tunheim wrote, noting the lack of clear limits on how expansively the ministerial exception can be used to shield religious employers from litigation.
The negligent supervision claim, which centers on whether university officials failed to manage those allegedly responsible for discriminatory acts, remains unresolved. The court denied the University’s request for summary judgment on that issue without prejudice and invited both parties to conduct targeted discovery before potentially revisiting the matter.
If further discovery shows that adjudicating the negligent supervision claim would not require courts to intrude on the University’s religious doctrine or governance, the claim may proceed. Otherwise, it could face dismissal on ministerial exception grounds as well.
Comment:
The ministerial exception, while constitutionally grounded, has increasingly become a legal shield used by religious institutions to avoid answering otherwise legitimate employee grievances. Its original purpose was narrow—protecting the autonomy of religious groups to select spiritual leaders without state interference. But in recent years, courts have interpreted it expansively, reaching deeply into roles that are, by any ordinary understanding, secular.
In this case, Rolanda Schmidt, an accounting professor, alleged severe workplace misconduct: racial harassment, retaliation, and even a hate crime. Yet the court held that because her job included leading students in prayer and incorporating Christian values into her teaching, she qualified as a “minister,” making her ineligible to pursue a Title VII claim. That conclusion aligns with current precedent but raises pressing questions about fairness and accountability.
These cases often follow a pattern: employees at religious institutions raise serious concerns—about discrimination, harassment, or retaliation—and find themselves barred from any legal remedy. The exception is being used not just to protect religious liberty, but also, in effect, to insulate institutions from responsibility. That doctrinal expansion threatens to leave thousands of teachers, counselors, and staff without workplace protections simply because their employer has a religious mission.
Ironically, many of these institutions profess to stand for moral leadership, justice, and community integrity. They ought to be at the forefront of modeling ethical treatment of employees—not at the edge of legal immunity. The courts, bound by precedent, may be compelled to apply the ministerial exception broadly. But the institutions themselves are not compelled to invoke it. Although the facts are still being reviewed by the courts, if faith-based employers rely on this doctrine to silence legitimate complaints rather than address them, it undercuts both the spirit of religious liberty and the moral authority they claim to uphold.