In a groundbreaking ruling, the United States Supreme Court has clarified the standards for bringing a lawsuit under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibits discrimination in employment based on protected characteristics. The decision in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, issued unanimously by the Court, states that a plaintiff in an employment discrimination case need only demonstrate that they suffered “some harm” that “need not be significant” to bring a lawsuit under Title VII. This replaces the previous standard of “adverse employment action,” which had been applied by courts but was not explicitly found in the statute.
The case at the center of the ruling involved Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow, a female police sergeant reassigned to a different position based on discriminatory reasons. Despite not being fired or explicitly demoted, the reassignment negatively affected her job conditions and opportunities for advancement.
The decision, authored by Justice Elena Kagan’s, clarifies that under Title VII, any harm suffered by an employee due to discrimination based on protected characteristics is enough to constitute a violation of the law.
Title VII Interpretation Until Now
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, a cornerstone of anti-discrimination legislation, prohibits employers from engaging in discriminatory practices based on protected characteristics, including race, gender, and religion, impacting various aspects of an individual’s employment such as compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges.
Although the statutory language does not explicitly mention “adverse employment action,” Federal courts have historically interpreted and applied this concept within the scope of the law. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued guidelines based on this definition of what constitutes adverse actions, encompassing hiring practices, termination, failure to promote, pay reductions, and demotions.
The courts adopted this approach, requiring such actions to result in a “materially adverse consequence” for a violation to be established. For instance, in the case of Ortiz-Diaz v. United States Dep’t of Hous. And Urban Dev (867 F.3d 70, D.C. Cir. 2017), it was determined that a transfer lacking any substantial economic impact may not meet the threshold of impermissible adverse employment action. Notably, the Fifth Circuit had specifically defined adverse employment actions to encompass hiring, firing, and instances of wage discrimination.
Supreme Court Finds Harm Does Not Need to be “Significant” to Violate Title VII
Muldrow v. City of St. Louis involves a female plainclothes police sergeant, Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow, who was reassigned to a “less dangerous” position because her supervisor felt her job was “too dangerous” for a woman. She was not fired or explicitly demoted, but she was reassigned to a new position that had a rotating schedule instead of her prior fixed Monday-Friday schedule, and where she no longer worked on high-profile cases that could have helped her advance in the department. She also lost access to her “take-home car.” She requested a transfer to another position as an assistant to a captain, but this was denied.
She sued, and the court dismissed her claim before trial (i.e. summary judgment) because it said that even if the transfer was discriminatory, it did not “produce a material employment disadvantage” and was therefore not within the definition of “an adverse employment action.” The Eighth Circuit upheld this summary judgment.
Last month, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that an employee challenging a job transfer under Title VII must show that the transfer caused some harm to a condition of employment but that the harm did not need to be “significant.”
The decision was written by Justice Elena Kagan and joined by five other justices. The decision observed that Title VII did not require that harm be “significant,” but if the employee was treated poorly in some way because of discrimination based on a protected characteristic like race, sex, religion, etc., that was enough to violate Title VII. Courts could use other methods to determine if a case was frivolous without having to allow discrimination without consequence.
Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito issued separate concurring opinions but argued that the degree of harm required to violate Title VII needed to be clarified.
Justice Brett Kavanaugh concurred with the opinion but disagreed with the requirement that there needed to be some “harm” found at all. He raised a hypothetical that might pass muster under the new ruling while still clearly violating the intent of Title VII in which an employer could tell an employee that they were providing a complete lateral transfer from one office to another because of the employee’s race, but with the same pay and benefits. He stated that any employment transfer on a discriminatory basis should be construed as having violated Title VII.
Supreme Court Broadens Scope of Title VII Protections in Employment Discrimination Cases
In a recent decision reflective of its commitment to a strict interpretation of Title VII, the Supreme Court ruled in Groff v. Dejoy (2023) to discard previous non-statutory guidelines that exempted employers from making religious accommodations carrying only minimal costs. The Court now mandates that employers must prove a substantial cost increase for such accommodations to be considered unreasonable.
Furthermore, the Court’s ruling challenges the conventional notion that an “adverse employment action” necessitates a significantly harmful impact on an employee under Title VII. Instead, the Court asserts that any level of harm, not necessarily substantial, suffices as grounds for claim, extending protections beyond mere job transfers to other discriminatory actions tied to specific protected characteristics.
This redefinition not only expands the potential scope of Title VII claims but also empowers plaintiffs to contest summary judgment motions in cases where no substantial adverse changes to employment terms or conditions are present.
Because this case opens the door to a broader array of Title VII cases, employers should take the opportunity to review and update their anti-discrimination policies and DEI protocols.
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Case: Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri (Docket 22-193 – Dec’d April 17, 2024)
Thank you for sharing this insightful article! The recent Supreme Court decision in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri is a crucial step toward workplace equality. It reinforces the importance of Title VII protections and ensures that employees are treated fairly, regardless of their protected characteristics. Kudos to the Court for upholding justice and promoting a more inclusive society!