This is 1 of 2 articles on the 2 cases heard today. Justices clash over whether a “perfect fit” is required for sex-based laws and whether the plaintiff’s impending graduation kills the case.
TLDR
On January 13, 2026, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Little v. Hecox, a pivotal case challenging Idaho’s “Fairness in Women’s Sports Act.” The law bars transgender women from participating in women’s student athletics. The arguments centered less on the cultural debate and more on two technical legal questions: whether the case is moot because the plaintiff, Lindsay Hecox, has stopped playing sports, and whether a valid sex-based law can be challenged “as applied” to a specific subclass of people. Idaho argued that sex classifications in sports are constitutional because they address average biological differences, and requiring exceptions for individual transgender athletes would impose an unworkable “strict scrutiny” standard. The liberal justices questioned why an individual with no biological advantage should be banned. The Court’s decision could either uphold the ban, mandate exceptions, or dismiss the case entirely on procedural grounds.
Case Info
Bradley Little, Governor of Idaho, et al. v. Lindsay Hecox, et al., No. 24-38
Date: January 13, 2026
Do Idaho’s restrictions on transgender athletes violate the Equal Protection Clause?
The Supreme Court appears divided on the merits but potentially unified on the procedural complexities of Little v. Hecox. While the liberal wing argued that the Constitution requires exceptions for transgender women who have mitigated any biological advantage, the conservative majority signaled skepticism toward creating “as-applied” loopholes for sex-based laws that are otherwise valid. Ultimately, the outcome may rest not on the constitutional definition of sex, but on whether the Court decides the plaintiff’s circumstances make the case moot.
Why is this case being heard now?
This case represents the first time the Supreme Court has directly addressed state bans on transgender participation in sports. Idaho was the first state to enact such a law, and its “Fairness in Women’s Sports Act” has served as a model for over 20 other states. The Court’s ruling will determine if states can categorically separate sports teams by biological sex at birth or if they must accommodate transgender athletes who suppress their testosterone.
Is the case moot?
A significant portion of the argument focused on whether there is still a live controversy. Lindsay Hecox, the transgender woman challenging the law, has dropped out of collegiate sports and is nearing graduation.
Justice Sotomayor pressed Idaho’s Solicitor General, Alan Hurst, on this point. She noted that Hecox signed an affidavit stating she “permanently stopped playing sports covered by the ban”. Sotomayor compared this to the Acheson Hotels case, where the Court dismissed a case after the plaintiff lost standing.
Hurst argued the case is not moot because Hecox’s plans could change again, as they have throughout the litigation. He invoked the “voluntary cessation” doctrine, arguing that a defendant (or in this unique posture, a plaintiff seeking to avoid a ruling) cannot moot a case simply by pausing their conduct. However, Ms. Hartnett, representing Hecox, countered that Hecox’s decision to stop playing was due to the “hostility and visibility” of the litigation and that she will graduate soon.
Can a valid law be unconstitutional “as applied” to specific individuals?
The core legal dispute involves the mechanics of “intermediate scrutiny,” the standard used for sex-based classifications. The parties agree that separating sports by sex is generally constitutional. The question is whether a plaintiff can carve out an exception for a specific subgroup—transgender women with suppressed testosterone—without invalidating the whole law.
Hurst argued that equal protection focuses on the validity of the classification itself, not individual fairness. He stated, “If the sex-based line passes intermediate scrutiny… then the edge cases, the potential exceptions, that’s all rational basis review”. He warned that requiring a “perfect fit” for every individual would effectively kill all sex-based laws.
Justice Kagan pushed back, asking why an “as-applied” challenge shouldn’t exist if the state’s justification (fairness and safety) doesn’t apply to a specific person who has no biological advantage. Hurst maintained that such an approach is essentially “strict scrutiny,” which requires a law to be narrowly tailored to every individual, a standard never applied to sex discrimination.
What is the role of biological advantage in the Court’s analysis?
The debate heavily featured the science of testosterone and athletic performance. Idaho contends that “sex is what matters in sports” because it correlates with advantages like muscle mass and lung capacity.
Justice Jackson questioned whether the law discriminates based on transgender status rather than just sex. She noted that the law “treats someone who is transgender… but who does not have… the same threat to physical competition” differently than cisgender women.
Ms. Hartnett argued that Hecox has “mitigated that advantage” through hormone therapy. She posited that if the state’s interest is fairness, excluding a trans woman with no physiological advantage does not serve that interest.
Justice Alito and Justice Thomas focused on the definition of sex itself. Alito asked if a school could exclude a biological male who identifies as a woman but has taken no medical steps to transition. Hartnett conceded the school could, arguing the issue is the mitigation of advantage, not just identity.
How does scientific uncertainty affect the legal standard?
Several justices expressed concern about the Court intervening while the science is still unsettled. Justice Gorsuch noted the “healthy scientific dispute” regarding whether testosterone suppression actually eliminates male athletic advantages.
Justice Kavanaugh pointed out that the sports world is currently divided, with some governing bodies allowing participation and others banning it. He asked why the Court should “jump in and try to constitutionalize a rule for the whole country while there’s still… uncertainty and debate”.
Hashim Mooppan, representing the United States in support of Idaho, argued that because the law is a reasonable fit for “99 percent of males,” it satisfies intermediate scrutiny. He suggested that if the Court allows challenges based on a tiny percentage of exceptions, it would force states to prove a perfect match between their laws and reality, which is impossible.
Commentary
The oral argument in Little v. Hecox revealed a Court hesitant to issue a sweeping cultural ruling when a procedural off-ramp exists. The mootness issue is real. If the plaintiff is no longer an athlete and is about to graduate, the Court acts as a debating society rather than a legal tribunal by deciding the case. The conservative justices, particularly Alito and Thomas, seem ready to affirm that “sex” in Title IX and the Constitution refers strictly to biology. If they reach the merits, they will likely hold that sex-separation in sports is a valid general rule that does not require case-by-case exceptions for gender identity.
The liberal wing, led by Justice Kagan, is trying to salvage the “as-applied” challenge. Their argument is subtle: they accept that sports can be sex-segregated, but they argue that once a specific individual proves they don’t undermine the purpose of that segregation (fairness), the Constitution demands an exception. This is a classic intermediate scrutiny argument. However, they face a numbers problem. As the U.S. Solicitor General pointed out, sex-based laws are rarely perfect. If a 99% fit isn’t enough, then almost no sex-based distinction—from the draft to bathrooms—survives.
Justice Gorsuch’s focus on “scientific uncertainty” is the wild card. He often favors letting legislatures, rather than judges, sort out messy factual disputes. If he believes the science is unsettled on whether hormone therapy eliminates advantage, he will likely vote to uphold Idaho’s law, deferring to the state’s judgment to err on the side of protecting the female category.
Ultimately, this case may end not with a bang, but a whimper. The Court could dismiss it as moot, waiting for a future case where a plaintiff has years of eligibility remaining. But if they do decide it, the “Answer-First” is likely that states have broad power to define the categories of athletic competition based on biology, leaving the accommodation of transgender athletes to the discretion of legislatures rather than constitutional mandate.
The mootness issue raises similar questions to other times the Court has ruled in cases that were “capable of repetition yet evading review” involving larger issues where the specific litigants were no longer in position to present a challenge but others could be.
Citations
• Transcript of Oral Argument, Little v. Hecox, Supreme Court of the United States, 13 Jan. 2026.
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Disclaimers
• This article was assisted by AI.
• This does not constitute legal advice. Readers are encouraged to talk to licensed attorneys about their particular situations.