The Ninth Circuit ruled that religious autonomy is a defense against lawsuits rather than a valid legal claim for restoring government funding.
Supreme Court Asked to Decide if States Can Block Grants for Ministries That Hire Only Christians
The Ninth Circuit ruled that religious autonomy is a defense against lawsuits rather than a valid legal claim for restoring government funding.
TLDR
Youth 71Five Ministries has petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to reverse a Ninth Circuit ruling that allows Oregon to deny public grants to religious groups that hire only coreligionists. The ministry argues that Oregon enforces non-discrimination rules against religious hiring while funding secular groups that restrict services based on race or gender. The Ninth Circuit held that the “religious autonomy” doctrine serves only as a defense against lawsuits and cannot be used as a standalone claim to challenge government action. This petition asks the Justices to clarify if religious organizations can sue under Section 1983 to protect their internal governance and hiring rights. The outcome will determine if states can condition participation in public programs on a waiver of First Amendment employment rights.
Case Info
• Case Caption: Youth 71Five Ministries v. Williams
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court (Petition for Writ of Certiorari)
• Date Filed: December 2025
• Source: https://adfmedia.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/youth71fivecertpetition.pdf
The Ruling in Question
The Supreme Court is being asked to reverse a federal appellate ruling that permits Oregon to disqualify a Christian ministry from a grant program because it requires employees to sign a statement of faith. The lower court held that the constitutional right to religious autonomy acts as a shield against judicial interference but not as a sword to challenge executive branch funding decisions.
Why This Case Matters Now
This petition challenges the “shield versus sword” distinction regarding religious autonomy. It asks the Court to decide if religious groups forfeit their right to select ministers and staff when applying for generally available public funds. The case arises after Oregon officials revoked approved funding from a youth mentorship program solely because the organization limits employment to practicing Christians.
What triggered the dispute between 71Five and Oregon?
Youth 71Five Ministries provides mentorship and vocational training to at-risk youth in Oregon. The organization has received state funding through the Youth Community Investment Grants program since 2017. In 2023, the Oregon Department of Education added a new rule requiring applicants to certify they do not discriminate in employment based on religion.
71Five certified compliance. The ministry argued its preference for Christian employees is protected by law and does not constitute “discrimination” under the state definition. Oregon initially awarded $410,000 in grants to the ministry. Following an anonymous tip regarding the ministry’s hiring practices, state officials reviewed the 71Five website. They confirmed the ministry requires staff to sign a statement of faith and attend church. Oregon subsequently revoked the grants and disqualified the ministry from the program.
How did the Ninth Circuit rule on the funding issue?
A Ninth Circuit motions panel initially granted an emergency injunction in favor of 71Five. It found the state likely acted without neutrality. A merits panel later reversed that decision. The merits panel ruled that the non-discrimination rule was “neutral and generally applicable”.
The court found that the rule applies to all grantees. It held that excluding groups that discriminate in hiring is a rational way to advance the state interest in inclusion. The panel rejected the argument that the rule targets religion. It stated that the rule disqualifies any applicant, religious or secular, that discriminates based on protected traits.
What is the disagreement over “Religious Autonomy”?
The central legal question involves the “religious autonomy” doctrine. This doctrine ensures religious institutions govern themselves without state interference. The Ninth Circuit held that this doctrine functions only as an affirmative defense.
Under this ruling, a church can use the doctrine to defend itself if sued by a terminated employee. However, the court stated the doctrine cannot support a standalone Section 1983 claim against government officials who revoke funding. 71Five argues this distinction leaves them without recourse when executive or legislative actions violate their internal governance rights. The petition asserts that the First Amendment protects religious hiring regardless of whether the government acts through a lawsuit or an administrative rule.
Does Oregon fund other groups that exclude participants?
71Five claims Oregon applies its non-discrimination rules unequally. The ministry presented evidence that the state funds secular organizations that restrict services to specific demographics.
• Gender Exclusions: One grantee explicitly serves only “youth who have experienced girlhood” and “female-identifying staff”.
• Race Exclusions: Another grantee, the Black Parent Initiative, focuses solely on supporting African American families.
71Five argues these secular exclusions violate the same non-discrimination rule used to disqualify the ministry. The Ninth Circuit rejected this comparison. The court distinguished between “hiring” (where 71Five discriminates) and “service delivery” (where secular groups target specific populations). The court found no evidence that secular grantees categorically refused service to protected classes, whereas 71Five admits to categorically excluding non-Christians from employment.
What happens next?
The Supreme Court will review the petition and decide whether to hear the case. The Respondents—Oregon state officials—will have an opportunity to file a brief in opposition. Four Justices must vote to grant the petition for the case to proceed to full briefing and oral argument.
Summary of Petition
The Ninth Circuit ruling creates a potential procedural trap for religious institutions. By classifying religious autonomy solely as an affirmative defense, the court effectively immunizes executive actions from constitutional challenge. If a state agency can penalize a religious group for its internal governance, specifically its hiring of ministers, and that group cannot sue to stop the penalty, the right effectively ceases to exist in the administrative state. Rights that cannot be enforced affirmatively are mere suggestions.
The distinction between “defense” and “claim” may collapse under scrutiny. The First Amendment forbids government interference with the selection of clergy. It does not matter if that interference comes from a judge hearing an employment lawsuit or a bureaucrat dispensing grants. Both actions penalize the religious institution for exercising a core constitutional right. The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that the government cannot force a choice between receiving a public benefit and exercising a constitutional right. This decision appears to force exactly that choice.
ADF argues that the “secular comparator” analysis applied by the lower court demands review. The state funds groups that exclude based on race and gender but punishes a group that excludes based on religion. The lower court’s attempt to distinguish between “service delivery” and “employment” is a distinction without a difference in the context of neutrality. If the state interest is “inclusion,” a program that excludes boys or non-Black families undermines that interest just as much as a ministry that hires only Christians. The government cannot favor secular forms of exclusion while punishing religious ones.
This petition offers the Court a vehicle to clarify the “sword vs. shield” debate. Lower courts have fractured on whether religious autonomy supports Section 1983 claims. A clear ruling here would establish that constitutional protections for church governance are structural limits on state power, not merely legal arguments to be deployed only after a church is sued.
Reply briefs are anticipated.
Citations
[1] Youth 71Five Ministries v. Williams, Petition for Writ of Certiorari, No. 24-4101 (U.S. Dec. 2025).
[2] Youth 71Five Ministries v. Williams, 153 F.4th 704 (9th Cir. 2025).
[3] Youth 71Five Ministries v. Williams, 2024 WL 3183923 (D. Or. June 26, 2024).
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Disclaimers
This article was assisted by AI. This does not constitute legal advice. Readers are encouraged to talk to licensed attorneys about their particular situations.
Tags: First Amendment, Religious Autonomy, Section 1983, Free Exercise Clause, Youth 71Five Ministries